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Governance of the governing 
Accountability and motivation at the top of public organizations 
Abstract: Developments in the governance practices in UK public organizations show how 
ideas from the governance of listed companies have translated into public sectors bodies, 
government departments and the governance of parliament itself. The use of independent, 
non-executives directors in public bodies encapsulates the tension in the private sector 
between the service role of directors and how they control the executives who manage the 
business. This paper gives a preliminary examination of three public bodies, comparing how 
reform of their governance mechanisms has affected tensions in accountability and director 
motivation. What is evident is that the changes involve greater emphasis on extrinsic goals, 
potentially at the cost of the intrinsic ones that characterize public service motivation. These 
tensions seem inevitable, and the challenge for board is to maintain a balance.  
Keywords: Corporate governance, public sector, government, accountability, motivation 
Something had to be done 
In May 2009 – in the depths of what we came to call the Great Recession and after years 
of obstruction from government and parliament – the Daily Telegraph newspaper in the UK 
published a series of articles based on leaked documents concerning abuses of expense 
claims by members of parliament from all the major parties. The details were shocking, even 
lurid: Mortgages on houses for MPs paid from the public purse, but then let out, to the MP’s 
personal gain; a duck house – a duck mansion, really – built in the garden of an MP’s stately 
home; pornographic movie rentals. Something had to be done. 
In central government departments – after decades of failed attempts to trim costs and in 
the face of deficits ballooning because of bank bailouts – the trajectory of public spending 
was clearly unsustainable. Procurement for defence in particular seemed out of control, 
welfare budgets were climbing with the economic slowdown, and – worryingly for the long 
term – baby-boomers were heading into retirement on under- or unfunded pension plans. 
Something had to be done.  
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In public sector bodies, those delivering services to the public, the crisis was no less 
acute. In health, for example, care for the elderly faced impossible projections of future 
service requirements at a time when budgets needed to decline in real, in per capita and 
perhaps even in nominal terms. Something had to be done.  
Moreover, the climate of cuts made inevitable by the demographics was exacerbated by 
the sense among the public at large that some people – the demonized bankers, yes, but also 
those in power in parliament, at the top of government departments and at the head of public 
sectors bodies – were getting away with daylight robbery. A lack of accountability 
threatened to de-motivate those working throughout the public service system. Something 
had to be done.  
It came in the form of importing an alien concept, a system of board-level governance 
developed in the private sector and in particular for corporations listed on stock exchanges: 
the independent, non-executive director. As we will see, the idea did not translate directly – 
translation is an imprecise mode of expression and to be meaningful it needs to be as 
sensitive to the receiving culture at least as much as it is faithful to the original. Whether it 
improves performance through lower costs or greater efficiency has proved difficult to 
assess, but it has had one benefit: A heightened sense of accountability and greater debate in 
the boardrooms of public bodies. But at what cost to motivation of the members of public 
boards? 
Motivation and directors 
“Serving on a [corporate] board is like taking on a position in public 
service. It is not (and should not be) a wealth creation opportunity but a 
chance to play a role in the proper workings of our marketplace” – Peter 
Weinberg, partner at Perella Weinberg Partners, a boutique investment 
bank (Weinberg, 2006). 
The quote from Peter Weinberg suggests that the motivation of directors, even in the 
corporate sector, may not be as self-serving as envisaged in theories based on rational 
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choice. Even if reasonably well remunerated, outside directors of private sector 
organizations could earn more in cash terms by offering their advice as consultants. For 
many serving of public sectors boards, the same is true. Moreover, in becoming directors – 
the human face of the legal person – they incur greater reputational risk and a higher threat 
of personal litigation.  
The quote also echoes the broader conceptualizations of public service motivation, such 
as the “general, altruistic motivation to serve the interests of a community of people, a state, 
a nation or humankind” (Rainey & Steinbauer, 1999, p. 23) or the “beliefs, values and 
attitudes that go beyond self- interest and organizational interest” (Vandenabeele, 2007, p. 
547). Moreover, these are intrinsic motivations. Yet the question remains whether, whether 
can be crowded out by the extrinsic ones of meeting targets, including those for profit, 
imposed by outside authorities (Frey & Jegen, 2001; Le Grand, 2003).  
While this paper focuses on the UK, its implications are wider. What we will see is in 
some ways an extension of the concepts of new public management (NPM) that developed in 
Britain in the 1980s (Ferlie, Ashburner, Fitzgerald, & Pettigrew, 1996). Much as the 
corporate governance reforms in Britain (Cadbury, 1992; Higgs, 2003; Walker, 2009) found 
resonance in jurisdictions around the world (Aguilera & Cuervo-Cazurra, 2009), NPM has 
influenced thinking elsewhere, though not always with strong acceptance (Christiansen, 
1998; Kickert, 1997).  
Four systems 
To examine the governance of those involved in governmental activities, let’s review the 
mechanisms used to hold public organizations to account. We start with a brief discussion of 
private sector arrangements in the UK Corporate Governance Code before reviewing how 
  4  
governance operates in three levels of the public sector: the health service, central 
government departments in Whitehall, and then in parliament itself. 
Governing the corporation 
Since 1992, Britain has operated a system of corporate governance rooted in the UK 
Corporate Governance Code, a voluntary set of principles for boards of listed companies. 
The first version, the Cadbury Code, retained the traditional UK unitary board, comprising 
executives and outside, non-executive directors, but it gave the latter particular powers. And 
it separated the role of chief executive from the chairman to prevent any one person having 
“unfettered powers of decision” (Section 4.9, Cadbury, 1992). Over the years, and in 
particular in response to the US corporate governance crisis of the early 2000s and the 
financial crisis of 2007–09, successive versions have given greater weight to the 
independence of these directors (Nordberg & McNulty, 2013), now recommending that at 
least half the board is independent of management, that they control the main board 
committees, and that the chairman is independent at the time of appointment. Such 
mechanisms are thought to prevent “groupthink” (Janis, 1972; Sundaramurthy & Lewis, 
2003) and help non-executives engage in supportive yet challenging ways with the 
executives (Roberts, McNulty, & Stiles, 2005). In so doing, they create the cognitive conflict 
thought to improve board and firm performance (Forbes & Milliken, 1999).  
Cadbury drew on ideas from the 1991 reforms in the UK National Health Service. But 
this extension and further articulation in the corporate sector – later endorsed by the 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, the World Bank and others – 
institutionalized their logic and gave them legitimacy worldwide. This external validation 
made them politically more appealing at home as a model for public sector reform. But these 
non-executives have to work with complex motivations associated with their dual roles: 
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“service”, which involves helping the executives find solutions and identify scarce resources, 
and “control”, monitoring the performance of executives and applying sanctions. 
Governing health 
Britain’s National Health Service may look monolithic from the outside, but it is a 
complex system of public and private bodies, most called “trusts”, subject to repeated reform 
attempts over the years. After the Thatcher government came to power in 1979 and through 
successive Conservative, Labour and coalition governments, attempts to increase the 
efficiency of service delivery have involved using market mechanisms and governance 
models from the private sector (Ferlie, Ashburner, & Fitzgerald, 1995; Moyes, Wood, & 
Clemence, 2011; Veronesi & Keasey, 2010).  
Early reforms involved bringing outsiders into the boardroom of NHS bodies, in 
particular the hospitals, for the purpose of providing guidance on commercial practice 
(“service”) and to foster internal, non-clinical challenge (“control”) to NHS managers. Over 
the years and explicitly modelled on a major reform of the UK code of corporate 
governance, the role and number of these non-executive directors has increased (NHS 
Appointments Commission, 2003). These principles were still current a decade later. They 
also split the roles of chairman and chief executive, and opened board meetings to the public, 
except when directors discussed patient-confidential issues. Evidence suggests the non-
executives have had an impact on monitoring the executives, the “control” function, while 
attention to strategic issues, the “service” function, faltered (ICSA, 2011). In a sense, 
therefore, these reforms seem to have focused on adding extrinsic motivations of targets and 
budget, while potentially disrupting intrinsic ones.  
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Governing government 
While such board arrangements spread tentatively to other front-line public sector 
bodies, government itself remained aloof. With the inconclusive election of May 2010 and 
the fiscal crisis that emerged from the financial services crisis in 2007–09, the coalition 
government of Conservative and Liberal Democrats felt the need to shake up the 
management boards of central departments. To improve their efficiency and accountability, 
it accepted guidance from Lord Browne, a former chief executive of the oil company BP, 
and issued a code of “corporate governance” for government departments (UK Government, 
2011). Ministers replaced senior civil servants as chairs of these boards, which had the effect 
of separating the role of chair and chief executive, in parallel to the corporate sector. The 
reform also introduced non-executive directors to bring an outside, independent voice into 
discussions of process and operations.1 Policy remains in the hands of ministers. These non-
executives have their own club, a forum in which they share ideas, led a “Government Lead 
NED” in the person of Lord Browne.  
Gains came in advice on potential improvements in purchasing (a “service” role), but 
anecdotal evidence suggests top civil servants resent the changes, which made them easier to 
replace but also had the potential to undermine their non-partisanship (signs of a “control” 
function), a sign that extrinsic motivating factors might be gaining more attention at the 
expense of intrinsic ones. In the first year, the reforms achieved little of their stated aims. 
The second annual report of the Government Lead NED spoke of improvements but awarded 
the system only five marks out of 10 (Browne, 2013). 
Governing parliament 
The job of parliament is to scrutinize government. Its governance arrangements differ 
again from those of government and public organizations. The Chief Clerk of the House of 
                                                 
1
 As of June 2013, there were 67 such non-executive directors serving 17 government departments. 
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Commons serves as both chief executive of the House Service and chair of its management 
board. But the House Service does not have the unitary board of the other systems reviewed 
here. Instead it reports to a Commission made up of MPs under the chairmanship of the 
Speaker of the House. This configuration has parallels in the two-tier boards of continental 
European companies, where the chief executive chairs a management board, made up 
entirely of executives, which reports to an entirely non-executive supervisory board, which is 
legally responsible for the company’s affairs. Such arrangements tend to emphasize 
“control” over “service” (Bezemer, Peij, Maassen, & van Halder, 2012).  
The UK Parliament’s management board is different. The Commission may have public 
legitimacy as elected officials, but they are also both customers of the House Service. And as 
politicians they have the potential to undermine the impartiality of the House Service. These 
conflicts of interest became most obvious in the expenses scandal, when the House Service 
was seen to have failed to challenge elected members of the Commons.  
What emerged were new governance arrangements, including first one and then a 
second non-executive on the management board of the House of Commons and an 
independent auditor of member spending (UK Parliament, 2013). The non-executives give a 
business orientation to a management team largely insulated from the discipline of markets 
(a “service” function). It remains to be seen the extent to which having non-executives 
enhances the board’s “control” side. Anecdotal evidence suggests these still new changes in 
the House Service have brought some greater emphasis on extrinsic motivations with 
uncertain implications for the intrinsic ones.  
Systems in comparison 
These four systems differ in their particulars, but they all involve certain core principles 
– the need for independent judgement and the need for strong knowledge of the organization 
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and, to a greater or lesser extent, the context in which the organization operates. The 
governance arrangements in all four systems are summarized in Table 1. 
 
Table 1 - Governance arrangements compared, private and public 
 
Corporate 
Governance Code 
NHS Whitehall House of Commons 
Board structure Unitary Unitary Unitary Two-tier 
(management board, 
reporting to 
supervisory 
Commission) 
Chair, Chief 
executive 
Separate roles, chair 
independent at time 
of appointment 
Separate roles, 
independent at time 
of appointment 
Secretary of State 
replaced the chief 
civil servant as chair 
Chief exec chairs 
management board; 
reports to 
Commission, headed 
by Speaker 
Non-executive 
directors 
At least half 
independent non-
executives; 
independents control 
of key committees 
Equal numbers of 
executives and non-
executives 
One, then several 
non-executives on 
departmental 
management boards; 
no policy role 
One, then two non-
executives on 
management board; 
Commission 
exclusively MPs 
Scope Ultimate decision-
making body 
Ultimate decision-
making body 
Decision-making on 
process, operations; 
policy reserved to 
ministers 
Decision-making 
over operations by 
management board; 
Commission 
responsible for 
organization policy 
Accountability Upwards, to 
shareholders, whose 
primacy, however, is 
disputed 
Downwards to 
patients vs. upwards 
to government; non-
executives 
accountable 
additionally to local 
communities 
Upwards, from 
ministers to 
government 
Management 
upwards to 
Commission, then 
downwards to voters 
Motivation and accountability 
The central problem in corporate governance lies in the tension between “service” and 
“control” at board level. The control side finds its base in agency theory (Fama, 1980; Fama 
& Jensen, 1983) and its contention that managers (the “agent”) will act in a self-interested 
way, extracting personal value at the cost of owners (the “principal”). These assumptions run 
counter to those of stewardship theory (Donaldson & Davis, 1991), a theoretical stance with 
many echoes of public service motivation. Stewardship theory suggests that most of the 
time, most managers try to do a good job. In agency theory motivation is extrinsic, in 
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stewardship theory intrinsic; agency theory validates control mechanisms, stewardship relies 
on trust; agency theory assumes individualistic approach; stewardship a collectivist 
orientation (Davis, Schoorman, & Donaldson, 1997). The corporate governance literature 
suggests that attention to agency theory focuses senior management and non-executive 
directors alike on extrinsic and often short-term targets, while deemphasizing achievement of 
the intrinsic satisfaction associated with decisions made for the longer term and greater good 
of the company. 
But there is a problem: Agency and stewardship views are incompatible in practice as 
well as theory. If stewardship theory applies to the work of managers, and the board that 
assumes agency theory applies, the organizational runs the risk of demotivating in particular 
senior management and the professional staff. But when managers act like agents, a board 
that assumes stewardship is following a recipe for disaster. For the public sector and in areas 
where public service motivation is strong, importing extrinsic targets risks crowding out 
intrinsic motivations. Table 2 summarizes the tensions and motivations across the four 
organizational forms examined here. 
Table 2 - Governance tensions and motivations compared 
 Corporate NHS Whitehall House of Commons 
Tensions Tension between 
“service” and 
“control” functions 
Tension between 
“clinical” expertise, 
managerial power; 
non-executive local 
politics 
Tension between 
civil service 
independence, 
political authority, 
business efficiency 
With emphasis to 
date on “service” 
role of non-
executives, tension 
between professional 
and political 
imperatives held at 
bay 
Motivations Extrinsic goals 
dominate 
governance reforms, 
but stewardship 
approaches rely on 
intrinsic ones  
Extrinsic ones risk 
crowding out 
intrinsic ones (care; 
professional 
prerogatives) 
Extrinsic budgetary 
targets risk crowding 
out intrinsic ones 
(civil service 
independence; good 
of the country) 
Extrinsic targets 
increasing, but 
predominance of old 
ways of working, 
reinforced by 
intrinsic 
motivations, create 
resistance to change  
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In the National Health Service under the Labour governments of 1997-2010 both risks 
were palpable. In return for a large expansion of budgets, government demanded 
accountability and set detailed performance targets, measured managers against them, who 
then measured clinical staff against them as well. Although the reforms moved in part away 
from market-based reforms on the Conservative government towards more central control, 
budgetary control and targeting left in place much of the emphasis on external motivation 
(Le Grand, 2002). The resulting culture of measurement and control in the NHS led the 
philosopher Baroness O’Neill, in the very public setting of her Reith Lectures for the BBC, 
to challenge whether the transparency created by targets, measurements and reporting served 
the goal of accountability. “Real” accountability, she said, comes between individuals, in the 
context of repeated personal interaction (O'Neill, 2002a, 2002b). The ability to account for 
one’s actions is best tested in face-to-face encounters, not spreadsheets. 
O’Neill’s comments found unexpected resonance at the start of the financial crisis in 
2007, when Britain suffered its first run on a bank in 300 years, the failure of Northern Rock. 
In an analysis of the botched rescue attempt by the government, its Financial Services 
Authority and the Bank of England, Roberts (2009) argues that too much transparency was a 
bad thing. He says “intelligent accountability” requires responsiveness both a) upwards and 
externally, and b) laterally and internally. The former he terms “individualizing” 
accountability, because individuals take responsibility, often publicly; the latter is 
“socializing” accountability, that is, within the boardroom, among challenging but collegial 
peers, a form that binds members of a board together (Roberts, 1991, 2001).  
Could fostering that “socializing” accountability be an antidote from some of this 
tensions in roles and an antidote to the effects when extrinsic goals crowd out intrinsic 
motivations? Non-executives on boards of both private and public sector bodies tend to be 
drawn from elites, and they meet only episodically. Moreover, they typically spend only part 
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of their effort on any one organization’s board and cross-fertilize their ideas as they move 
from board to board. They are therefore, for several reasons, likely to be able to resist the 
effects of crowding out of intrinsic motivations. Fostering the socializing type of 
accountability may help them to hold at bay the contradictions of agency and stewardship 
theory and sustain broader, social and even altruistic imperatives in the face of pressure of 
externally promoted performance targets. The presence of public service motivation among 
directors of public sector organizations would seem only to enhance that ability.  
Conclusions 
This paper gives preliminary insights into governance arranges at private and public 
bodies and how they seem to affect the balance of extrinsic and intrinsic motivations among 
board members, an area that seems ripe for further research. But changes at board level 
matter only insofar as they translate into the practices and motivations within the 
organization. Three further issues thus arise, warranting investigation. First, to what extent 
do these changes in governance mechanisms affect the motivation of senior executives and 
top management teams? They take direction from the boards and draw upon the advice 
(“service”) and respond to the monitoring (“control”) by non-executives. Second, how, if at 
all, do such changes affect the character of public service motivation among middle 
managers and frontline staff? Third, how do non-executive directors, most brought in from 
private sector occupations, respond to close engagement with the public sector and 
underlying principles of public service motivation?  
In the three public sector settings this paper has examined, mechanisms adopted from the 
private sector have in effect been translated from one setting to another (Czarniawska & 
Joerges, 1996). The translation has not been exact, in part because the contexts demand 
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otherwise, and in part because old institutional arrangements and the incumbent culture of 
these organizations resist change.  
In the National Health Service, policy shifts and ministerial action have dictated almost 
constant organizational change, yet the evidence suggests that clinicians still have 
considerable sway. Even in the boardroom, the lay, non-executive directors defer to their 
expertise. That expert power (French & Raven, 1959) can prevent diffusion of new practices 
and thwart new structures and mechanisms. In Whitehall, the civil service has lost some of 
its influence in recent boardroom changes, but the evidence suggests that outsiders on the 
board remain outside, and that the continuity provided by civil servants, when coupled with 
shifts in ministerial appointments, provides stability and even rigidity in the face of calls for 
radical change. In the House Service – the part of the public sector puzzle most detached 
from the public – the need for change is accepted. Yet there, both staff and senior managers 
are isolated from the pressure of markets. Their external accountability is to the elected 
members of parliament they are meant to service and control.  
The board level problem in the public sector is that of balancing conflicting aims. On the 
one hand, boards must recognize the need to meet external imperatives that can run counter 
to the motivations that led to the attraction and retention of key staff motivated by a desire to 
serve a larger social purpose than budgetary targets can inscribe. On the other, they need to 
foster that internal drive for altruism that resists market-based approaches. Holding both in 
mind is similar to, but also different from, balancing the demands for service and control.  
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